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SPECIFIC CAPITAL, MOBILITY. AND WAGES: WAGES RISE WITH JOB SENIORITY
ABSTRACT
Theidea thatwagesrise relativeto alternativesasjob seniority accumulates is the
foundationof the theory of specific human capital,aswell as other widely accepted theoriesof
compensation. The fact that persons with longer job tenures typically earn higher wages tends to
support these views, yet this çvidence ignores the decisions that have brought individuals to the
combination of wages, job tenure, and experience that areobservedin survey data. Allowing for
sourcesofbias generated by these decisions, this paper uses longitudinal data to estimate a lower
bound on the avenge return to job seniority among adult men. I findthat10 years of current job
seniority raises the wage of the typical male worker in the U.S. by over 25 percent. This is an
estimate of what the typical worker would lose if his job were to end exogenously. Overall, the
evidence implies that accumulation of specific capital is an important ingredient of the typical
employment relationship, and of life-cycle earnings and productivity as well. Continuation of
these relationships has substantial specific value for workers.
Robert Topel
Universityof Chicago
Graduate School of Business
1101 East 58th Street
Chicago, IL 606372
1. tntrodntloi
The idea that wages rise relative to alternatives Over the duration of a job is the
foundation for several important theories of productivity and compensation. Most prominently,a
key prediction of Becker's (1964) model of investment in specific human capital is that wages rise
with job tenure (seniority), leaving workers with a stake in the specific value of the employment
relationship. Related theories of agency in durable employment relations (Becker and Stigler,
1974; Lazear, 1981) also generate deferred compensation that encourages workers' effort and
improves performance.t Deferred compensation in the form of rising wages can also induce
profitable self-selection of heterogeneous workers that enhances productivity (Salop and Salop,
1976). Other contracting models (Harris and Holmstrom, 1982; Freeman, 1977) produce
qualitatively similar predictions for the shape of job—specific wage profiles. These ideas are
sufficiently established that the assumption of rising wage profiles has become an accepted point
of departure for subsequent work (e.g., Shleifer and Summers, 1988).
In all of these models, a major component of earning capacity is both unique to a
particular employment relationship and increasing in importance as the relationship ages. Senior
workers would suffer substantial wage losses if their jobs were to end. Thus a common theme is
specialization and, from a worker's perspective, the accumulation of job-specific capital. The
credibility of this view is enhanced by the common finding from survey data that workers with
longer job tenures typically earn more, which has been interpreted to mean that seniority raises
earnings for the typical worker, and by related evidence thAt turnover rates (quits and layoffs) are
strongly and negatively related to job tenure.2 These relationships are the empirical foundation
for the view that specific capital is an important ingredient of life-cycle earnings and
productivity in modern labor markets.
This interpretation of the evidence is open to criticism because it ignores the job-
changing decisions that have brought workers to the combinations of wages, job tenure, and
'See also Latest and Rosen (1981) and Rosen (1986).
2Mincer and jovanovic (1981) provide evidence on both points. Others include Borjas and
Rosen (1980), Bartel and Borjas (1981), Parsons (1977), and Mincer (1986, 1988).3
market experience that are observed in survey data. These decisions can affect the relationship of
job tenure to wages in two ways. First, recent evidence indicates that many job-changing
decisions are the outcome of a career process by which workers are sorted into more durable and
productive jobs (Hall, 198Z Topel and Ward, 1988). High-wage jobs tend to survive, which can
mean that persons with long job tenures earn higher wages. The second possibility is that more
productive or able persons change jobs less often, for which there is also empirical support.
Again, personswithlong job tenures will earn high wages. In either case, the wage earned by the
representative worker need not riseastenure accumulates, yet in a cross section of workers those
with greater tenure earn more because tenure is correlated with unobserved characteristics of
workers or their jobs. Recent empirical research tends to support this view: adjusting for
unobserved factors in various ways, at least four recent studies have concluded that the true
returns to job-specific experience are minor.3 This reinterpretation of the evidence has found
widespread acceptance in subsequent literature (Mortensen, 1987, 1988; Rosen, 1987).
This conclusion has important implications for the way that economists view labor
markets. Using Becker's (1964) terminology, it means that human capital investments are mainly
general rather than firm-specific, so that the main component of workers' embodied skills is
portable among firms. Thus investment in human capital does not account for the prevalence of
"lifetime jobs" in the U.S. and other labor markets (Hall, 1982), or for the sharply lower turnover
rates of more senior workers. Further, in the absence of specific capital the costs of worker
displacement and unemployment are likely to be smalL even for relatively senior workers these
events should not have important effects on workers' wealth because previously accumulated skills
are portable. Finally, the independence of wages and job tenure undermines the entire
compensation literature that treats the timing of wages as a strategic device for affecting worker
productivity. Either the problems of moral hazard and asymmetric information that underlie this
literature are unimportant, or they are solved by other means.
3Altonji and Shakotko (1987), Abraham and Farber (1987), Marshall and Zarkin (1987), and
Topel (1986). Brown (1983) and Mincer (1988) provide direct evidence that job training enhances
wage growth.4
Asthe title suggests, this paper provides strong evidence thatwages do rise with job
seniority. I analyze longitudinal data on earnings and job histories for 1540 men drawn fromthe
first 16 waves (1968—83)ofthe Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). The main finding is that
the avenge returns to seniority are substantial. The estimates imply that 10 years ofjob seniority
raise the wage of the typical mate worker in the U.S. by over 25 percent relative to what hecould
earn elsewhere. Both theory and related evidence imply that this estimate is a lower bound; the
true returns are probably larger. This estimate does not vary across broad occupational
categories—professionals and nonunion blue collar workers receive roughly similar returns, though
the presumed rationing of union jobs alters this conclusion for workers covered by collective
bargaining. For them, a job displacement that forces a move to the nonunion sector would reduce
earnings of a worker with 10 years of seniority by nearly 40 percent. This effect is much larger
than traditional estimates of union wage premiums (Lewis, 1986) because it reflects the full cost
of leaving the union sector, including forgone specific capital, and may account for the much
greater avenge durations of union jobs.
All of this evidence is based on a two-stage estimation procedure. The basic idea is that
within-job wage growth combines the returns to general and job—specific experience. Thus the
first stage estimates the determinants of wage growth, but is unable to distinguish separate returns
to general market experience and job-specific seniority. The second stage is a cross-sectional
comparison of the wages of workers who started new jobs at different points in their careen.
This stage yields an upper bound on the returns to general experience alone. In combination with
estimates from the first stage, this translates to a lower bound on the returns to seniority in the
typical employment relationship. In all cases that I have examined, the estimated returns to
seniority are substantial. Along the way, additional sources of bias are examined and are found to
have very minor effects on the results.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section provides preliminary evidence of
important effects of job seniority on wages, based on the observed wage changes of workers who
were displaced from their former jobs. Workers with longer prior job tenures suffer substantially
greater losses from displacement, as would occur if wages rise with the duration of employment.S
Thebasic econometric framework is then developed and potential sources of bias in estimating
the returnsto job seniorityand experience are explicitly modeled. Section III describes the Panel
Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) data and methods of selecting the sample. The main empirical
resultsfollow.
Because these results and conclusions are substantially different than those reported in
important recent studies, section V of the paper compares my procedures and findings to those of
Altonji and Shakotko (1987) and Abraham and Farber (1987), who also analyzed the PSID data. I
find that earlier efforts understate within-job wage growth, due both to significant problems of
measurement error and to methodological biases. Section VI concludes the paper.
II. Modelln the Returns to Experience and Job Tenure
A. Some Preliminary Evidence
Do wages depend on job seniority? The methods I develop below rely on panel data that
follow the evolution of wages within jobs, but suggestive evidence is provided by tabulating the
wage changes of workers whose jobs end exogenously. If job tenure raises wages relative to
alternatives, then more senior workers will suffer larger wage reductions when employment is
terminated. The estimates in Table 1 are based on the Displaced Workers Survey that was
administered with the January CPSin1984 and 1986. The sample consists of 4,367 men who
report that they have been displaced From a job for economic reasons (layoffs or plant closings) in
the past five years, and who are currently employed. The table reports the mean change in log
weekly earnings for these workers, as weil as the avenge number of weeks unemployed since
displacement and the reason for termination. There is little doubt that displacement is costly the
average worker who has found new employment suffers a 14 percent reduction in earnings. More
importantly for present purposes, this reduction in avenge earning capacity is strongly related to
prior job tenure: those with longer jobs lose more, and they experience more unemployment after
displacement. Thus the "costs" of displacement are strongly related to prior job tenure.
There are two possible explanations for this rmding. One is that wages rise with
seniority, so workers with longer job tenures are truly more specialized than their juniorTABLE 1
WAGECHANGES OFDISPLACED WORKERS
BY YEARS OF PRIOR JOB SENIORITY
JANUARY CPS 1984 AND 1986
Years of Seniority on Prior Jot,
0-5 6-10 11-20 21+ Total
Avenge change in -.095 —.223 —.282 -.439 —.135
logweekly wage (.010) (.02!) (.026) (.07!) (.009)
Percent displaced
by plant closing .352 .463 .528 .750 .390
(.008) (.021) (.026) (.043) (.007)
Weeks unemployed 18.69 24.54 26.66 31.79 20.4!
since (.413) (1.202) (1.536) (3.288) (.385)
displacement
Noms.—Estiinatesrefer to male respondents between the ages of 20 and 60. Sample size is
4,367.Nominal data are deflated by the OMP price deflator for consumption expenditure.
Figures inparenthesesare standarderrors.6
counterparts.The other is thatlongjobs paid higher wages throughout, and so tenure acts as a
proxyfor the relative "quality"of the terminated job. Distinguishing these hypotheses requires
paneldataon individuals' job histories,asbelow.A thirdhypothesis, that workers withlong
formerjobs are more able, is not supported by these estimates. This finding is consistent with
evidence developed below, which shows that biases due to unobserved personal characteristics are
a minor concern.
B. A Prototype Model
A prototype model of wage determination is
(1)
wherey denotes the (log) wage for individual i on job jattime s, I, is total labor market
experience, and 7', is current job tenure (seniority). Parameters $andfi2 represent average
returns to an additional year of either experience or tenure, respectively, and are the parameters
of interest for the remainder of the paper. Other observables that may enter (1) are ignored for
ease of exposition. No generality is lost by also ignoring higher order terms in A' and T; they wilt
be introduced in the empirical analysis.
The most popular interpretation of (I) is that $1representsthe return on general human
capital (training and the like) that accumulates with experience, while $representsthe return on
accumulated job specific capital that would be lost if a job were to end. Biases in estimating
these returns are generated by covariance between the regressors and the unobservables, d.In
what follows my main concern will be with covariance that is the outcome of optimizing
behavior, as workers seek to locate and maintain a productive (high wage) employment
relationship. Thus decompose the unobservable as
(2)
-
whererepresena the stochastic component of wages that may be specific to a worker-firm pair
and p is a person-specific effect that accounts for unobserved differences in earning capacity7
acrossindividuals (e.g., "ability"). The v,account for market-wide random shocks as well as
measurement error that is known to plaguesurvey data.I assume that the components of (2) are
mutuallyorthogonal, and(for now) that p1 and v0areorthogonal to the regressors in (I). Notice
thatfixed "job effects"(#*— #) area special caseof (2) inwhich thespecific value of a job does
notevolve overtime.Thiscomponentcaptures the notionofa "goodmatch"in the sense of
wages thatarehigherthan what a worker could obtain elsewhere. It will generate biasin
estimating (I) if is correlated with experience or job tenure. Thusletthe auxiliary regression of
on the observables be
(3)
In light of (3), least squares applied to (I) will yield biasedestimatesof fi1 and fi since 6ft1 — fi +
b1 and E2 — ft2 + b. In much of what follows, I seekevidence onthe importance of the
parameters b, and b3.
Theory offers some guidance on the signs of these effects. In light of job matching or
search theories of job mobility (e.g., Burdett, 1978; Jovanovic, l979ab, 1984) it is plausible that a
productive (high wage) match, once found, is unlikely to end. Given this,itis tempting to argue
that job quality, , andtenureare positively related(b2>0) in survey data.4 This argument
ignores the fact that persons who change jobs gain, on avenge, from their move, and they are
includedin the data at low jobtenures.'In fact, the basic theory of searchandmatching implies
that b2 c 0—a comparison of wagesforworkers with different job tenures will understate the
returns to seniority—as the following argument demonstrates.
Consider identical individuals who sample new job offers from a stable offer distribution
G&). Offers arrive randomly at an exogenous rate. If the true values of fi and ft2 are zero, an
optimal job changing policy is to accept any offer that exceeds the wage on the current job. Thus
'Most matching modelsgeneratewage dispersion from the assumption that individuals'
productivities vary among tasks. A contrasting "segmented markets" view is that wage
differentials merely reflecttheexistence of "good"and "bad"jobs, for unspecified reasons(e.g.,
Doeringer andPiore,1971). Which of these istruedoesnot affect thefollowing analysis.
'Lang (1987) makes a related point.8
high-wage jobs survive because they arelesslikely to be dominated by an alternative offer.
Under these conditions,the current wage of anyindividual is the maximum offer received since
entering the market. The expected value of this maximum clearly rises with experience since the
number of offers sampled increases. Thus b1 > 0. In contrast, current job tenure only indicates
the order in which the maximum offer was receive& persons with high tenure received their best
offer earlier. But the distribution of the maximum offer (the first order statistic) depends only on
the number of offers received (experience) and not on their order (tenure).' This means that
EQIX,T) — £(y$X) and there is no sample selection on tenure (b2 — 0).' In this case experience is a
sufficient statistic for the distribution of wages and there is no bias in estimating $2. But things
are different if ftp.0.
If $2> 0 acceptable new job offers must compensate workers for the forgone returns to
tenure on the current job, so there is less mobility than when $2 — 0. Since a regression compares
conditional means, the issue is whether E(x,r+l)•EQIX,fl+8,. That is, do persons with one
extra year of job tenure earn a wage that is higher, on avenge, by $,? With $2> 0 some other-
wise acceptable offers have been rejected. Inclusion of these marginal workers reduces the
average wage of "stayers." Further, persons who change jobs require higher average wage offers
to induce their move. This raises the avenge wage of movers. Both of these selection effects
imply E(yJX,T+l) - E($jX,T) <$ so least squares applied to (I) must underestimate the return to
seniority.' Thus a basic matching technology with rising within-job wage profiles implies b1> 0
but b, < 0. Yet the notion that "good jobs survive" still holds. Let I, denote experience at the
'For it offers received, the density of the maximum offer is f(y) — G(y)g(j), which
depends only on n. With random (Poisson) arrival of offers, the expected number of offers is
proportional to time in the market (experience).
'Formally, the absence of a tenure effect in this case requires tha experience effects be
represented by a sequence of dummy variables for each level of experience.
'The selection is easiest to see in a two-period case. If-workers receive one offer per
period, then exchangeability implies that E(,yy,> y,) — E(y11y1> y. If wages grow by ft among
stayers. thenE(y1jy1+$>y,)cgQ.jy1+ficy,). ThusE(y2+$ly1+$>y-E(yy,>y1+$)cfi. Otherfactors may increase or decrease the bias. For example, mobility corn strengthen the bias
because acceptable offers must be better to induce a move. Endogenous search intensity weakens
the bias because persons with high wages are less likely to sample.9
startof a job, so I. I, +T.Then (3) is equivalent to —1b1+T(b1+b2).Thus the durability
of high wage jobs means that b1 +b2>O, so the sumofthe returns to experience and tenure will
be biased up in a wage regression on survey data.
In light of this analysis, there can be no presumption that standard regression techniques
applied to cross-sectional data will overestimate the returns to tenure. Optimizing search
behaviorgenerallyimplies the opposite, though there are other sources of selection that may
reinforce oroffsetthese effects. For example, mobility costs tend to reinforce b2 c 0 by reducing
theset of acceptable wage often, while costly search may cause b5> 0 because only persons with
relatively poor employment matches are actively searching. Panel data on individuals' careers
provides leverage for isolating these effects, to which I turn next.
III. A Two-Stan EstimailpuProcedure
Panel data from sources like the PSID provide information on wages at different stages of
a single job, as well as on different jobs for a single individual. Given this, within-job wage
growth can be studied from the first differences of (I) for persons who do not change jobs, which
eliminates fixed job and individual effects:
(4)
since X *AT—Ibetween periods of a single job. If e -ç hasmean zero, then (4) will yield
a consistent estimate of average within—job wage growth, $ +P2.° Given(4), an estimate of fl1
can be obtained from initial wages on new jobs:
(5)
'Topeland Ward (1990) find direct evidence for both b1 >0and b1 +b2>0. They estimate
that approximately one third of wage growth during the first ten years in the labor market is due
to job-changing activity. Controlling directly for unobserved personal heterogeneity, they also
find that wage increases and transitions to higher-paying jobs sharply reduce job mobility.
'°This is assumed for now, though mobility decisions may also generate selection in (5),
because only acceptable values of & are observed. This point is examined in section IV.d.l0
whereXis initialexperienceon the job. The error term in (5) is non-random because only
acceptable new joboffersare observed.For example,and A'0 are positivelycorrelated if
expectedmatch qualityriseswith time in the market. One approach to this problem is to
explicitly model the mobility decisions that underlie this selection bias, in which case standard
sample-selection corrections(e.g., Heckman, 1976) might beapplied. With this strategy,
identificationrelics crucially on distributional assumptions(wage offers must be normally
distributed),as well as on other strong restrictions (Topel, 1986).
A more robust alternative is simply to note the selection bias implicit in (5) and to treat
(8 +fl2)
— asan estimate of the return to seniority. If frisbiased up, this two-step procedure
yields a lower bound on the return to seniority. More generally, since A' aA'0+Tmodel (1) may
be rewritten as
(6)
where B a $1+ fir Using(6), a two-step model is given by the first differences of within-job
wage growth (4), and
(7) y- TE—181+e
where S• fi +istheconsistent first-step estimatorofthe sum of the returnstoexperience and
tenure,derived from (4), and e e +T(R-5).As a second-step model, equation (7) is
preferable to (5) because it makes use of data from all periods of all jobs.
The two-step model given by (4) and (7) yields consistent estimates of fi1andP1 only if
£ x:€— 0.This condition will not hold if job matching is important. Nevertheless, we may
calculate the expected values of the two-step estimators of $ and $2upto the unknown
parameters b1 and br Applying least squares to (4) and (7), some algebra establishes thatthese are
(Ba) E1ft1—fi1+b1+111(b1+b3)
(Sb) E—$-b1-,1Ab1+b1),11
where 1 is the least squares coefficient from a regression of tenureoninitial experience, 1e
Equations (Sa,b) indicate that the two-step procedure yields biased estimators of the
returns to market experience and job tenure. The biases are equivalent, but of opposite signs,
because the sum $1 + $ is consistently estimated from the flrn-step model. If systematic job
changing is important (b,> 0, b, + b2> 0), productive employment relationships are located later
in the typical worker's career. Then(8a) impliesthat E > 0,—the estimated returns to
experience are biased up because they include the return to changing jobs—while (Sb) implies E&
<ft for the same reason. Thus the two-step model establishes a lower bound on the avenge
return to seniority. Notice in particular the difference between the bias in (Sb) and the least
squares bias, br in estimating ft. Though earlier discussion indicates that the sign of b3 is not well
established by theory, the bias in (8b) is negative so long as "better" jobs are located as time in
the labor market accumulates. Virtually any model of optimal job changing has this property.
There are two possible caveats to this conclusion. First, if job changing is the outcome
of optimizing behavior for workers then jobs offering low wage growth may not survive. Since
equation (4) applies to an employment relationship that survived from date i—I to 1, avenge wage
growth in this sample of "stayers" may exceed the rate of growth in the population of all jobs. In
this case $2 could be overestimated. Second, persons who change jobs frequently may be less
productive, on average, than persons in stable employment relations. Then 1, is lower for able
persons—they started their current jobs earlier—end so,è, is biased down. Again, ft could be
overestimated. I provide evidence on both of these effects below.
IV. Estimation
A. The Data
The procedure described above is applied to panel data from the first 16(1968-1983)
waves of the PSID." Complete sample selection criteria are reported in the appendix. For the
estimates that follow, attention is restricted to white males between the ages of 18 and 60
"The data were kindly supplied by Joe Altonji and Nachum Sicherman.12
(inclusive) who were not self employed, employed in agriculture, or employed by the government.
All individuals are from the random, non-poverty sample of the P511) (SEO observations are
deleted). The data analyzed here consists of 13128job-years on 1340individuals and 3228 jobs.
Summary statistics and definitions for all variables used in estimation are reported in appendix
Table Al. A complete listing of all programs and output underlying both data construction and
results in this paper will be supplied at cost for one year after the date of publication.
The wage data refer to (log) avenge hourly earnings in calendar years 1967-82. Since
the parameters in (1) refer to relative earnings differences at a point in time, the usual regression
strategy is to control for aggregate real wage growth and inflation by including year-specific
intercepts. There are two problems with this in the current context First, cross sections of the
PSID data may not be representative of the underlying population at each point in time. The
records available for analysis include households that participated in the survey at the last survey
datç here 1983. Households that left the survey before 1983 are not in the data. Thus even if the
1983 sample is representative, past cross-sections based on these households will reflect the
sample selection rule that causes households to remain in the PSID. Second, in following any
fixed population in panel data, time is not statistically exogenous for the same reason that
experience isn't average match quality rises with time in the market. In this situation, treating
time effects as exogenous may lead to an understatement of the return to seniority and an
overstatement of temporal wage growth." To avoid these problems, I deflated the wage data by a
wage index for white males calculated from the annual demographic (March) riles of the Current
Population Survey (see Murphy and Welch, 1988). This index nets out both real aggregate wage
growth and changes in any aggregate price level (the GNP price deflator for consumption was
used), so that wage data from different time periods of the panel are expressed in comparable
units. Values for the wage index are reported in the appendix.
UIn fact, avenge real wages rise slightly more rapidly in the P5W than in random samples
of the CPS. A vector of year dummies was included inc standard log wage regression as
specified below. The year effects indicated that P5W wages grew by about 7.0 percent relative to
CPS cross sections during the 1970s. When the same regression was applied to the subsample of
individuals who entered the data in 1968-69 (n -6929),the time effects were elbninted. Thus,
there is no evidence that wages of individual P5W cohorts grew more rapidly than the population.13
Akey step in the analysis was the construction of a consistent measure of current job
tenure.Because of a numberof sources of measurement error, reported tenure in the PSID data
is not reliable.Itis often recorded in intervals ofseveralyears, and recorded values are often
inconsistent betweensuccessive yearsof the same job. This measurement error is magnified in
the first step model, which uses changes in seniority between successive years to estimate
parametersof wagegrowth. The problem is acute when higher-order terms (T',)are added to
themodel.'3 Tocorrect for these problems,the measureof job tenure used here relies on the fact
that tenure mustrise by one year in each yearofajob:For jobs that start within the panel,
tenure is startedatzeroand incrementedby oneeach year. For jobs that wereinprogressat the
beginningofan individual's record, current tenure is measured relative to the maximumreported
during the job, again imposing the restriction that tenure change by one each year. Within jobs,
the resulting sequence of measured job tenures is perfectly correlated with labor market
experience, as required.'
B. Wan Growth Within Jobs
If the evolution ofwageswithin jobs follows a random walk, then the residuals of the
wage growth model are serially independent and least squares applied to (4) is an efficient
estimator of fi1+ $3. AppendixB examines the time series properties of within-job wage changes,
yielding two important conclusions. First, there is no evidence of positive serial correlation in
within-job wage innovations, c - This is a strong finding, since one might expect that some
types of jobs offer steeper wage profiles than others. The lack of serial correlation implies that
heterogeneity in permanent rates of wage growth among jobs is empirically unimportant. Second,
I find that the within-job evolution of the wage has a strong permanent component that closely
'Eurther details on these points are appended.
'l'here are many cases of ambiguity about job endings. For example, reported tenure
within a job may fall to zero, and then rise smoothly. These cases suggest unrecorded changes of
employer. These "jobs" were deleted, but doing so had no material effect on the results. See the
appendix for details.14
approximatesa random walk, so the residuals satisfy
(9)
where isseriallyindependent withmean zero. Becauseof(9),values of'lpreflect
"permanent"changes in a worker's expected lifetime wealth. Forexample1these may reflect
uncertainreturns oninvestments in humancapital,orsimplynew information about a worker's
productivity.It follows that if these changes are firm—specific, then they are rents that will
affect future job-changing decisions. In contrast, if they mainly represent changes in general
human capitalthenfuture job mobility will be unaffected by them. These possibilities have
different implications for interpreting the estimated returnstoseniority, to which I will return
below.
Given these findings, Table 2reportsvarious specifications for first-stage models of
within job wage growth. Generalizing the earlier discussion, these and all subsequent models
allow for higherordereffects of experience andtenureon wages (e.g., fl, the effects of which
areidentified from within-job wage changes (e.g., r a 2X - I). As above, the model is
underidentified by one parameter because linear terms in experience and tenure are perfectly
correlated withinjobs.Thusthe first coefficient in column (I) (.1242) is an estimateofth+
for new entrantstothe labor force (I — 0). Wage profiles areconcavein both experience and
tenure, though the usual quadraticspecificationis insufficient to describe thedata:after an initial
period of rapid growth, wage profiles flatten out, which is captured in column (3) by quartics in
bothexperienceand tenure.'5 To illustrate the impact ofjobtenure on wage changes within a
job, at the bottom of the table I report predicted wage growth for a worker with ten years of
market experience and varying job tenures. Wage growth clearly declines as tenure accumulates,
holding experience constant, a pattern that is difficult to reconcile with the idea that tenure has a
negligible effect on wage levels.
'5As Welch (1979) points out, the usual quadratic underestimates wage growth for young
workers. Murphy and Welch (1989) also advocate a quartic specification for the experience
profile.TABLE 2
Models ofAnnual Within-Job Wage Growth
PSIDWhiteMales, 1968-83
(Dependent Variable is Change in Log Real Wage, Mean — .026)
Model
(1) (2) (3)
A Tenure .1242 .1265 .1258
(.0161) (.0162) (.0162)
ATenure2(x 102) -.0518 -.4592
(.0178) (.1080)
A Tenure' (x l0) .1846
(.0526)
A Tenure' (x 101) -.0245
(.0079)
A Experience2 (x 102) -.6052 -.6144 -.4067
(.1430) (.1430) (.1546)
AExperience' (x 10') .1460 .1620 .0989
(.0482) (.0485) (.0517)
AExperience' (x 10') .0231 .0151 .0089
(.0054) (.0055) (.0058)
.022 .023 .025
SE .218 .218 .218
Observations 8,683
Predicted Within-Job Wage Growth by Years of Job Tenure
(Workers with 10 Years of Labor Market Experience)
Tenure
1 2 3 4 5. 6 7 8 9 10
Predicted
Wage Growth (%).068.060.052.046.041.037.033.030.028.026
Note.--Estimates based on within-job first differences of log avenge hourly earnings.
Standard errors are in parentheses.15
The resultsthat followarebased on the model incolumn (3) of Table 2.
C. Estimated Returns to Market Exoeriertce and lobTenure
The main results for the separate returns to experience and tenure are reported in Table
3. In implementing the second step model that underlies these results, consistent estimates of $1+
fi, andtheparametersof higher order terms in experience and tenure are taken from the within-
jobgrowthmodel in column (3) of Table 2. Denote these terms by x.Subtractingxtfromboth
sidesof the wage equation and lettingF denote thevectorofotherfactors (education, etc.) that
affectwages yields the second-step model
(10) i,,- xt—X81+ F'+e
which is in the form of equation (7). As shown in column (I) of the table, the estimated value of
$fromimplementing (10) is about seven percent. This estimator is substantially smaller than the
value of $+ fl estimatedfrom within job growth, which is reproduced in column (2). The
remainder is the main effect of job tenure on wages. fit. I estimate that in the first year of the
typical new job, the real wage rises by over five percent ($— .0545)due to the accumulation of
job-specific experience alone.
Cumulative returns to various lengths of job tenure are reported in the bottom panel of
the table. The estimates are based on the main effect of $— .0545,together with the concavity of
the wage profile implied by the effects of higher order terms in Table 2. The returns to seniority
are large: I estimate 10 years of job seniority increases the wage of the typical worker by 28
percent (e.3e -I),relative to alternatives. For comparison, I also report estimates of the wage
profile generated by OLS applied to (1). These effects are larger, though not dramatically so.
Since I have argued that the two step procedure generates a lower bound on the true returns, the
OLSestimatesmay actually be close to the truth.
Are these results reasonable? An appropriate interpretation of the estimated returns to
seniority in Table 3 is that they represent the reduction in earning capacity that would be
suffered by a person whose job ends for exogenous reasons. Accordingly, these results imply that- TABLE3
Second-Step Estimated Main Effects of Experience (8k)and
Tenure (fit)onLog Real Wages; and Least Squares Bias
in WageGrowth (b1 + b2)
ExperienceWithin-Job Tenure Wage Growth
Effect Wage GrowthEffect Bias
$1 fi+fi
.0713 .1258 .0545 .0020
(.0181) (.0161) (.0079) (.0004)
EstimatedCumulativeReturntoiobTenure
5years 10 years ISyears 20 years
Two—Step Model .1793 .2459 .2832 .3375
(.0235) (.0341) (.0411) (.0438)
OLS .2313 .3002 .3203 .3563
(.0098) (.0105) (.0110) (.0116)
Notes.--Estimatedwithin-job wagegrowth (fit+ fit) from Table 2,
column(3). Dependentvariablefor other estimates is log real
hourly earnings less the effects of variables that are consistently
estimated from the within-job wage growth model. Other
regressors in the second-step model (10) include years of
completed schooling, marital status, residence in an SMSA, current
disability, union membership, and eight indicators for census
region of residence. Estimated cumulative returns are based on the
main effect of job tenure (82— .0545)plus the effects of higher-
order terms in tenure shown in column (3) of Table 2. Standard
errors (in parentheses) are corrected to reflect sampling error in
the first-step estimates. N— 10,685.16
a person with IS years of current jeb tenure would suffer an immediate 33 percent (e -I)
wage loss if his jobendedexogenously. This is the experiment underlying the estimated losses of
displaced workers in Table I, which shows an average wage reduction for workers in this tenure
categoryof about 32 percent.Despite obvious differences in the composition of the two samples,
the similarity of these estimates is gratifying. The results here also indicate thatworkersmay
bounce back from these losses fairlyrapidlyrelative wage growth is most rapid at the beginning
of new jobs, so initial wage losses would vastly overstate changes in lifetime wealth caused by a
job termination.
A finalpointabout these estimates is noteworthy. Though the two step procedure cannot
identify the bias terms b1andb1separately,their sum is clearly identified since fi+ fi is
consistently estimated. In fact, b1+ b2 isthe component of wage growththatis caused by
systematic job changing. And since Ee + T(b1+b1), thenotion that "good jobs survive" is
equivalent to b1+ b2> 0.This sum can be estimated directly by reinserting the term T(b1 +b1) on
the right side of equation (10) and applying least squares. The resulting estimate, shown in
column (4) of Table ,isa wage growth bias of about two tenths of one percent per year.
Finally, from (8) the bias in the two-step estimators of $ and fi is
(11)
A regression of current tenure on initial experience yields — -.25,so the second term in (II)
is -.25x(.0020) —.0005,or one twentieth of one percentage point per year. This means that the
bias in the two-step estimator of fit, the return to job tenure, is virtually independent of any
covariance of job tenure with the unobservables, that is of the unsigned value of b?Sinceba?.0,
the downward bias in the estimated return to seniority is solely due to improvement in match
quality with total labor market experience.
D. Other Sources of Bias
Under the stated assumptions, the estimates in Table 3 are a lower bound on the avenge
returns to job seniority. Other sources of bias can weaken this conclusion, and at least two are17
worthinvestigating. One possibility is that the sample used to estimate$ +$is weights toward
jobs with unusually high wage growth, whichmay affect the interpretation of the return to
seniority. The second possibility is that more able or productivepersons are also less mobile, so
estimated returns reflect the longer avenge job durations of highwage individuals. 1 treat these
in turn.
Selection Bias lii WageGrowth
Thecumulative returns shown in Table 3 are estimates of job-specificwage premiums
that would be earned by a typical worker as he accumulates seniority. Themost popular
interpretation of these returns is that workers anticipate rising compensationover the life of a
job, as in contract models like Becker (1964), Lazear (1981), or Salop and Salop(1976). A second
interpretation is also possible, however, since jobs that yield highwage growth may be more
likely to survive. In this case returns to seniority are realized period by period, thoughthey may
not be anticipated at the start of a job.
To illustrate this point, rewrite the wage growth model (4)
(4')
whereq, is the "permanent" increment to the wage defined in (9). For a job that ends between
dates i-I and 1,thewage y,, that would have been earned up to (is not recorded, but it may have
been known by workers. if a substantial component of,jisfirm specific, then knowledge of q
wilt affect mobility decisions, and so jobs with high values ofy -y.1will be more likely to
survive. This means that average wage growth among workers who do not change jobsmay
overstate growth in the population, which is to say that Eq> 0in the sample. An estimate of fi +
$based on wage changes within jobs includes this selection effect1 which would cause a
corresponding overestimate of the anticipated returns to seniority, $'bythe preceding methods.
As a practical matter, both $> 0 and Eq> 0imply that wages rise with seniority. Senior
workers earn more, relative to alternatives, than they did when they started their jobs. This
means that previous conclusions are not materially affected if Eq,0,but also that it is difficult18
to distinguish these alternatives in the data. The difference in the interpretation of the returns to
seniority is of some theoretical interest, however. Some headway in distinguishing these explain-
tions is possibleby examiningthe relationship between current wage growth and subsequent job
changing.
Thekey condition for E >0to be quantitatively important is that a substantial
component of q must be firmspecific.'6 Thena large value of '.hasa permanent effect on the
value of a job, reducing mobility in period I and all subsequent periods)7 For example, since the
wage follows a random walk, job-changing decisions in period t+l are based on+ and the
expected value of ,y must be smaller for jobs that end in t+l than for those that survive to later
periods. More generally, when , is firm specific the expected value ofis increasing in Rr the
remaining life of the job measured from date I. Thus,
(12) 0<E(qJR,> 0) .c E(qJR,> 1) < E(JA1> 2).
Evidenceon the inequalities in (12) is presented in Table 4. The first panel shows the
relationship between the remaining life of a job and current wage growth, after controlling for
observables. The estimate in row (1) shows that there is no linear relationship between these
variables. Row (2) is less restrictive, allowing separate effects for jobs that end in year t+l, t+2,
and so on. Since the omitted category is jobs that survive six or more years, all of these effects
should be negative but decreasing in magnitude if (12) is satisfied. This pattern does not hold,
though there is minor evidence that jobs that end in periods t+l and :+2 have slightly lower
growth.
The bottom panel of Table 4 makes the test more stringent. If high-growth jobs tend to
"The decision to change jobs depends on the job specific component of an alternative offer,
#,relativeto innovations to job-specific capital on the current job. i.Mobilityoccurs when -
is larger than some critical value, say k. If #andq are independent normal random variables,
the expected value of ipinthe sample of nonmovers is 501* - c k) —o/fr3+o4)' f(k)/F(k),
where 1(k) is the standard normal distribution function. Thus the amount 01selectiondepends on
the relative magnitudes of e4anda.
"Timing is also importsnt. Even when'7 is firm specific, it may take time to locate an
acceptable new job. Then , affects mobility only afterperiod1,andestimates of fi,+ fi based
on (4') are unbiased (E —0).TABLE 4
The Effects of Selection Bias in Wage Growth
on the Estimated Returns to Job Seniority
Panel A:
Relationship between Remaining Job
Duration and Current Wage Growth
Remaining
Job
Duration Job Ends in Periot
(Years) 1+1 t+2 1+3 1+4 :+5
(1) .0006
(.0010)
(2) -.012 -.015 .013 .012 .020 .004
(.012) (.013) (.013) (.014) (.015)(.017)
Panel B:
Returns to Job Seniority Based on
Various Remaining Job Durations in First-Step Model
Remaining Job Duration in Estimating Wage Growth (Yearsi
MainEffects >0 >1 >3 >5
Experience(ftp) .0713 .0792 .0716 .0607
(.0181) (.0204) (.0245) (.0292)
Tenure ($) .0545 .0546 .0559 .0584
(.0079) (.0089) (.0109) (.0132)
EstimatedTenure Profile
5 years .1793 .1725 .1703 .1815
(.0235) (.0265) (.0319) (.0379)
10 years .2459 .2235 .218 I .2330
(.0341) (.0376) (.0437) (.0514)
15 years .2832 .2439 .2503 .2565
(.0411) (.0445) (.0504) (.0594)
20 years .3375 .2865 .3232 .3066
(.0438) (.0469) (.0531) (.0647)
Nons.--j,, PanelA.otb.rngresson an — reported In Table 3. Paa.aMIng job duration Is the numb.: of lean
fronts to Sb. last obe.rv.d year of Sb. job. An Interaction of inag duration with a dummy for jobs that censor at the
end of 0*. panel I. also included, but It bad no effect on Sb. results. In row (3) the omitted category I. jobs that tastedsix
or mon yeen beyond the current date. In panelS, the fins-step models mo jobs with different r..fllaing job durations.
For example. the last column estimate wags growth at tfrom jobs that pint.. five or mars yean beyond s. Standard
errors are In parentheses.19
survive,then the inequalities (12) imply thatestimates of thetint-step model of wage growth
based on more durable jobs wiU overstate $ +$, whichwill increase the estimated returns to job
seniority. I find no evidence for this effect. In fact, tenure profiles estimated from jobs with
longer remaining durations—five or more years beyond the current date in the last column—are
virtually the same as the full-sample estimates reproduced in the first column of the table.
Overall, I have not been able to find any evidence that selection on i,playsan important role in
affecting estimates of wage growth or the returns to seniority. This evidence favors substantial,
anticipatedreturnsto seniority in the typical employment relationship.
AbilityBiasInthe Returnsto JobTenure
Tothis point I have maintained the assumption that unobserved characteristics of
individuals, p1. are unrelated to observed job tenure. Yet an alternative rationale for the positive
relationship between job tenure and wages is that workers' unobserved productivitie! are
negatively related to mobility. For example, more able (high wage) persons may change jobs less
often, so tenure and wages will be positively correlated in survey data even if $— 0.Evidence
suggestive of this is that education, an observedelementof human capital, is negatively related to
job changing. Alternatively, if turnover is costly to employers then the net productivity of stable
workers will be greater, and employers wilt pay more to obtain them. In either case, unobserved
characteristics that raise wages (pJ are positively correlated with observed tenure, which raises the
estimated returns to job seniority.
Because p, is a fixed effect, covariance of p with the regressors in (I) wilt not bias
estimators of $+ $2' whichis based on wage changes. Yet estimates of $and$fromthe second
step model (7) will be biased if p and initial experience, X, are correlated. In this case, the bias
in the estimated return to seniority from the second step model is
(13)
where —(19'Xj'X,'p. Ifhigh-p persons change jobs less often, then on avenge they started
their current jobs earlier. This implies i,, <0, so the second step estimator of $mayoverstate20
the returns to seniority.
The importance of this bias can be evaluated if there is an intrumental variablethat is
uncorrelated with the fixed effects1 Un but correlated with A'r A plausiblecandidate isLola!
experience.A'.Specifically, I assumethatthe distribution of g, is unrelated to experience
(successivecohortsofworkers are equallyableandequally mobile)so thatE(X'p) — 0. With this
condition,I maybe usedas an instrumental variableforI,inestimatingthesecondstep model
(7). Theresultingbias inthe IVestimator offiis
(14) Efi7fi2b1-"
•
where1,, istheleast squares coefficient from a regression of tenure (7)onexperience (X).This
biasin the IV estimatorisindependent of the distribution of PrFurther,'re. •.50 inthe data and
previous results implyLi, + b1> 0(see Table 3).Thus theright handsideof (14) isnegative,so
that $7providesa lowerboundon $evenwhen ii,and tenureare correlated.If p, and tenureare
correlated, then the estimated return to seniority will be lower when i is used as aninstrument
for Xinthe second step model."
Estimatesofthe returns to seniority when A' is usedasan instrument in (7)differ
trivially from those reported above. The estimatedmain effectof seniorityfallsfrom .055
per year,reported in Table 3,to.052 under IV. Over a 10 yearhorizonthis implies a difference
of only 3percentin the cumulative returntoseniority, relativetothe25 percentcumulative
returnshown above. This is fairly strong evidence thatunobserved personal characteristics donot
accountforthe substantialreturnsto seniority shown inTable3.
"Comparisonof equations (16) and (IS) implies that Efr7cE&<fiwhen•0. Thus
leastsquares isthepreferredestimatorin (7) if unobservedcharacteristics andtenure are
uncorrelated.21
E. Occunational Differences in Wage Profiles
All of the preceding resultsrefer to workersin an array of occupations, ranging from
laborers to highlypaidprofessionals. It is not hard to imagine technological or other differences
across occupations that would generate corresponding differences in wage profiles. For example,
investments in specific skills may be more important among professionals, while collective
bargaining agreements may limit the ability of employers to backload wages in unionized
environments. Thus the preceding results may be sensitive to aggregation across diverse groups.
Because of sample size limitations in the PSID it is not possible to examine these issues in fine
detail. Instead, evidence is presented for three broad categories of workers. Among craftsmen,
operatives, and laborers I treat union and non-union workers separately." The third category
consists of professional and service occupations. I finesse issues of promotion and the like by
categorizing all periods of a job on the basis of the reported occupation in its first observed
period.
Estimates of the time series properties of tge changes showed only minor differences
across groups. Briefly, the earlier finding that wages follow a random walk within jobs also holds
for each of the occupational groups. The only difference worth noting is a substantially smaller
variance in wage changes among unionized workers. Since collective bargaining arrangements
normally set wages according to scale, this finding is plausible.
Table 5showsestimated main effects of experience and job tenure, as well as cumulative
returnstovarious levels of tenure, for each occupational group. The main finding is that
estimated returns to tenure are quite similar across broadoccupationalcategories. Differences in
returns between white and blue collar professions are trivial, as are differences in returns between
union and non-union workers within blue collar professions. In fact, aggregation of the three
wage profiles cannot be rejected.
"Jobs werecategorizedas "union" if the respondent indicated union membershipin more
than half of the years of thejob. Otherdefinitions were alsofried,butthe resultswere not
sensitiveto these changes.
tITABLE 5
Estimated Returns to Job Seniority by Occupational
Category and Union Status, Two-Step Estimator
Professional
MainEffects and Service Craftsmen. Oneratives. Laborers
Nonunion Union
Experience (fir) .0707 .1066 .0592
(.0288) (.0342) (.0338)




Estimated Cumulative Relative to:
Returns to Tenure at Union Nonunion
Sector Sector
5 years .1887 .1577 .1401 .2299
(.0388) (.0428) (.0437) (.0931)
10 years .2400 .2073 .2033 .3286
(.0560) (.0641) (.0620) (.0854)
15 years .2527 .2480 .2384 .4111
(.0656) (.0802) (.0739) (.0855)
20 years .2841 .3295 .2733 .4904
(.0663) (.0914) (.0783) (.0957)
Observations 4946 2642 2741
Notes--The effects of higher-order terms in experience and tenure (X1, K', X, T2 r,7")
are estimated from models of within—job wage growth in each occupation. These are not reported
separately. Other second-step regressors are as listed in the note to Table 4. For unionworkers
the column labeled "union sector" measures f(X,T) -y"(X,0),so it is the wage premium relative
to starting a new union job. The column labeled "nonunion sector" measures y"(X,T) -
soit is the premium relative to a new nonunion job.22
Conceptually, thecumulativereturns shown in Table$measurethereturn to Tyears of
jobseniority in sector iasy'(X,T) - (X,O); the differencebetweenthewage at tenure7' and
what could be earned on the typical alternative job in the same sector. This comparison may be
inappropriate for union members. Since union jobs (u) are normally rationed, the relevant
alternative may be employment on a nonunion job (n). In this case the correct estimate of the
return to Tyears of seniorityis flX,T) - fiX,0). This estimate will differ from the return to
seniority for unionized workers because (i) unionized workers earn a premium that is lost in
moving to the nonunion sector, and (ii) the returns to total market experience differ between the
union and nonunion sectors. This point is demonstrated by comparing the two columns of
cumulative returns for union members. When measured relative to another union job, y'(X,O),
estimated returns are essentially identical to those in other sectors. But measured relative to the
nonunion alternative, y"(X,O), returns are both larger and risinga. According to the estimates in
the last column, the typical union worker with IS years of seniority would suffer a 50 percent
(e41' - I) wage cut if his current job were to end and he was forced to seek employment in the
nonunion sector. This estimate of what a union worker would lose if his job were to end
combines the union seniority effect. f(X,T) - f(X,0). and the union wage premium for new
workers, f(X,0) -
V.ComparisonswIth Other Research
Myresults and conclusions are substantially different from those reported in recent
research. Specifically, the PSID data have also been analyzed by Altonji and Shakotko (1987) and
The typical union member in these data started his job at X • 10 years of labor market
experience. For these calculations, I assume 2', — 10 and allow both experience and tenure to
accumulate from that point. Thus a person with 5 years of job tenure also has 15 years of labor
market experience, and so on. Effects of other regressors (education, etc.) also differed between
union and nonunion jobs. The calculations refer to a person with avenge characteristics, so these
differences are reflected in the estimates.
'A referee has pointed out that an estimate of the union wage premium at variouslevels of
tenure is the difference in the cost of displacement for union and nonunion workers, assuming
that all find nonunion jobs. This is (y'(X,T) - y'(X,O) - ) - (y'XX,T) - y'(X,O)) — /(X,T) -
y(X,T). This is the difference between column 4 and column 2 of Table 5. Notice that this
measure of the union wage premium rises with tenure.23
by Abraham and Farber (1987), who conclude that the true returns to job seniority are minor.
This difference in results cannot be attributed to the samples analyzed, since they are virtually the
same. An accounting of the reasons for our different findings is therefore warranted.
Altonji and Shakotko apply an instrumental variables (IV) procedure to a model like (1).
They note that the deviation of job tenure from its observed, job-specific avenge is orthogonal
to factors that are fixed within a job. If job effects are not time varying (#— #) then -
+ p1)•0,and so Or, •- T isa valid instrumental variable.S They therefore estimate a
version of (1) by instrumental variables, using Z— (I,DT)asinstruments. It turns out that this
IV estimator is a variant of the two—step procedure outlined above, which facilitates comparison.
Let FE —(X,T), sothe instrumental variables estimator of (I) is (fr,ft7)' — (Z'W'Ty.Writing
out these moments, some algebra establishes that
(I Sa) fly- (UDT) 4rD'D,
(lSb) r—(rx0)-'r(Y-
Noticethat (ISa) is simply the least squares estimator of B —fit +$2 usingdeviations from within—
job means rather than wage changes as a first-step model. This estimator of B is consistent when
there are fixed job effects. The estimator of $in(lSb) is equivalent to using I. X+ Tas an
instrument for X in the second-step model (7). Given a consistent estimator ftof8, this IV
procedure is equivalent to the test used above for the importance of individual effects.
Straightforward calculations yield
(16) Kft — £ $' + - t,rXbt +
whereftisthe second-step estimator of fifoundby applying least squares to (7), and where '7
and7.a,,- are the least squarescoefficients from regesssions of tenure (T) on I or X respectively.
flhe preceding evidence that the evolution of the wage within jobs follows arandom walk
is not consistent with fixed job effects unless all of the random walk component occursin genera
human capital.24
Empiricaily, y,. —.50and•-.25.Since b1+ b2> 0,this means that the IV procedure
produces a greater upward bias in the return to experience, and so a greater downward bias in the
return to tenure. This is one reason for the small tenure effects estimated by Altonji and
Shakotko.
A second reason for our different results is measurement error in recorded job tenure.
As I noted earlier, job tenure in the PSID contains a large number of inconsistencies. For
individuals used here, the range of within-job, year to year changes in recorded job tenure is
from -3! years to 7.5 years, and 36% of all changes in tenure fall below the theoretical value of
1.0. Becausetenureis recorded in intervals, many jobs last several years with no change in
reported tenure. This measurement error is magnified when within-job changes in tenure are
used to estimate parameters of wage growth, so that estimated values of $+ fi willbe biased
down. In fact, the measurement error problem is so serious that reasonable estimates of the
parameters of wage growth cannot be derived from the uncorrected data?
A final reason for the difference in our findings is that we use different methods to
control for aggregate changes in real wages. As noted earlier, my estimates are based on wage
data that are deflated by a real wage index calculated from cross-sections of the Current
Population Surveys. This means that wages in different years are expressed in comparable units.
In contrast, Altonji and Shakotko control for changes in real wages by including a time trend in
their regressions. If aggregate wage growth is truly linear, and if cross sections of the panel are
random samples of the population at each point in time, then this method is appropriate. Then
because experience, tenure, and time change at the same rate during a job, within-job wage
growth provides an estimate of A+ fi + fi,, wherefi,isthe trend rate of growth of aggregate
wages. Comparison of avenge sample wage levelsovertime indentifies fi,separately.Problems
arise if the avenge "quality" of the sample improves through time, as the data indicate to be the
case in the P510. Then the avenge sample wage grows during the panel even if fi,— 0,causing fi,
tobe overestimated. This causes an additional downward bias in estimated returns to job tenure
2'The appendix provides details.25
because ft2— (ft + ft2 +- ft1 - ftr
Table 6 documents eachofthese points.Column(1)ofthe table reproducesthebasic
findings of Altonji and Shakotko, using the uncorrected PSID data on current job tenure, as well
as their IV procedure and specification. For these estimates, all terms in job tenure, such as
are instrumented by deviations from within job means, for example -T',butthe levels of all
terms in experience, such as K and 2 are treated as exogenous. The estimates confirm the small
return to job tenure that was found by Altonji and Shakotko. Column (2) reproduces this
specification in the corrected data, where tenure rises by one in each year of a job. In these data
estimated returns are more substantial; at twenty years of seniority the cumulative return from the
corrected tenure data is roughly triple the estimate from the error-ridden data, though still
smaller than in the two-step procedure set out above.
Column (3) takes the next step, replacing current experience with initial experience in
the list of instrumental variables. Since higher order terms in experience are also endogenous,
they are also instrumented by deviations from job-specific means. For example, i'-r serves as
an instrument for X. With fixed job effects, this means that the effects of higher order terms in
experience and tenure are consistently estimated. With this adjustment in the instrument list,
estimated returns are larger still. Finally, column (4) drops the endogenous time trend from the
list of instrumental variables, which results in estimated returns that are roughly equivalent to
those produced by the two-step method employed above. This is not surprising, since (18)
indicates that the IV specification is essentially equivalent to a two—step procedure.
In contrast, the very small effects of seniority estimated by Abraham and Farber (1987)
are caused solely by differences in methodology. They argue that completed tenure (the ultimate
duration of the job) is a good proxy for unobserved dimensions of job or worker quality when
either good jobs survive or able persons are less mobile. Since completed duration is unobserved
for most observations in available panel data (the data end during each person's last observed job,
which tends to be his longest), they fill in "expected" completed job tenure for censored
observations based on the frequency of job endings in the data. Call the ultimate estimate of
completed duration 7' — 7' + R, where 7' is the last observed job tenure for a particular job andTABLE 6
The EffectsofMeasurement Error and Alternative
Instrumental Variables on the Estimated
Returnsto Job Tenure
OritinalTenure Data Corrected Tenure Data
Basic (I, T-T, time) (X, i'-?, time) (.1°, T-?, time) (.1°, T-?)
Instruments
Main Effect of .030 .032 .035 .045
Job Tenure (82) (.007) (.006) (.007) (.007)
Cumulative Returns
at Tenure:
5 years .078 .098 .121 .155
(.0206) (.017) (.019) (.021)
10years .074 .122 .177 .223
(.025) (.024) (.022) (.025)
ISyears .052 .13! .21! .264
(.031) (.028) (.020) (.024)
20 years .052 .161 .252 .316
(.039) (.035) (.018) (.024)
Notes.-—The basic specification is identical to that in earlier tables. Other instruments are as
follows. In all models T2 -P,- ?, i"-T',education, union membership, disability, residence
in an SMSA, census region, and married. In columns (1) and (2X r, A's, and t. In columns (3)
and (4) X -I',A" -A",X -26
Risthe predicted residual life of the job (— 0 for uncensored spells).
The procedure they propose for estimating $ is to includeT' asa regressor in an
augmented version of (I)
(17) y.s
Intuitively, 7' is meant to capture the effects of unobservables, and p. and so to reduce the bias
intheleast squares estimate of fl. Again letting Tdenotethe avenge observed value of tenure
on job j, what is being estimated in (17) is illustrated by adding and subtracting a1 + fi,) from
the right-hand side
(18) ye 1fi1 + (2" - TXPI+fit)+TC81++ 71 +
Least squares applied to (17) is equivalent to estimating (18) and imposing the restriction that the
coefficients on 2" - TandTareidentical. Notice that A', a I - 2" and Y are fixed within a job, so
2"- Tisorthogonal to both of them by construction. Thus estimates of (18) withouttheimplied
parameter restriction will yield a consistent estimate of $ + 8 in the case of fixed job effects.
But the selection problem being addressed is that job—specific variables like Twiltbe correlated
with the unobservables, so the least squares estimate of $1 + fi multiplying 7' will be biased. Thus
imposing the cross parameter restriction implicit in (17) yields an inconsistent estimator of fi +
Id 2•
"This inconsistency is a short panel bias caused by the fact that the PSID (and other data
sources) contain incomplete longitudinal histories. To see this, let 7" beJhe first observed value
of tenure on a job (7" — 0 for jobs that begin during the panel). Then 2" — (7" + T')/2. Substitute
this and r —+ Rinto(20), yielding
(Fl) y —1%+(7'-B+ + .58)+RO+.57'S+
Again, TL, R,and7' are fixed within jobs, and they are orthogonal to 2" - Tbyconstruction.
According to the theory that motivates this approach, they will be correlated with the
unobservables because of mobility decisions, so the restricted estimate of 8 will be inconsistent.
With complete longitudinal histories this source of bias vanishes because 7" — A — 0 when the
beginning and end of each job are observed. In this case, least squares estimation of (Fl) as
equivalent to a two-step procedure given by the deviations from means estimator of 8 and
(Fl) y-71-X,31+lt#+e.27
The evidence on these points is in Table 7. For purposes of comparison, the models in
Table 7 include only a quadratic in experience and only a linear effect of tenure, which is the
functional form used by Abraham and Farber. Because the estimated residual life of a job is a
(nonlinear) function of the observables, I also report estimates that control for the observed
completedduration of a job, T',plusthe interaction of 7" with an indicator that is one for jobs
that censor at the end of the panel. Column (1) reports least squares estimates, while columns (2)
and(4) reportthe restricted estimates that include measures of completed tenure in the regression.
The unrestricted models thatarenot subjecttothe bias just described are in columns (3) and (5).
These estimatesarederived byapplying(18)andsolving for $fromestimates of $+ $ and$.
Theestimates in columns (2)and(4) are qualitativelythesame as those produced by
Abrahamand Farber, showingnegligible effects of tenure in comparison to column (1). Columns
(3) and (5) show thattheimplicit restrictions in columns (2) and (4) are decisively rejected,
however,andthatrelaxing theserestrictionschanges the results. In these models fi+ $ is
consistentlyestimated and the estimated return to seniority is of the same magnitude as the least
squares estimate in column (I). The effect of completed job tenure is largerthan in columns (2)
and (4) as well. Thus the estimates are consistent with the notion that good jobs last longer, in the
sense that long jobs pay high wages throughout, yet this fact does not reduce theestimated
returns to seniority. As above, the returns to job seniority are substantial.
The main reason for this difference in results is a severe underestimate of within job wage
growth from the restricted modet evaluated at the sample mean level of experience (18.4 years)
the restricted estimates in column (4) yield a predicted annual rate of wage growth of only 1.9
Equation (P2) is in the form of the second-step model (7), augmented by the proxy variableP.
If T'isa positive predictor of the unobservables (D> 0) and that more durable jobs occurlater in
careers (cov(X0,T") >0),then inclusion of 1" in the model will reduce the upward bias in
estimating fiandraisetheestimated return to seniority.
Basic conclusions are unchanged for less restrictive functional forms.
"To model job endings, I estimated a discrete time proportional hazards model where the
hazard rate is A —exp{Z},and Zincludesthe full vector of regressors used in the wage models.
The estimates are described in the appendix.TABLE 7
LEAST SQUARES MODELSCONDITIONING ON (ESTIMATED)
COMPLETEDJOB TENURE, PSID WHITE MALES
UI (21 UI (41
Experience .0418 .0379 .0345 .0397 .0401
(.0013) (.0014) (.0015) (.0013) (.0014)
Experience -.00079 -.00069 -.00072 —.00074 -.00073
(.00003)(.000032)(.000069)(.000030)(.000069)
Tenure .0138 -.0015 .0137 .0060 .0163
(.00052) (.0015) (.0038) (.00073) (.0038)
ImputedCompleted- - - .0053 .0067
Tenure (.00036) (.00042)
Observed Completed
— .0165 .0316 — -
Tenure (.0016) (.0022)
xCensor - -.0025 -.0024 - -
(.00073) (.00073)
(Experience2) - —.00061 - -.00075
(.000036) (.000033)
Tenure - - .0 142 .0429
(.0033) (.0016)
.422 .428 .432 .433 .435
NOTES --Seenotesto Table 4for other regressors. Dependent variable is log average
hourlyearnings. Standard errors are in parentheses. Columns (2) and(4) implementversions of
the restricted model given by equation (19) in text. Estimates in columns (3) and (5) are based on
the unrestricted model (20).28
percent.3' The corresponding deviations from means estimate from column (5) is 3.0 percent. The
reason for the bias is apparent from the estimated impact of T, which is a biased estimate of ft1 +
fix,For example, in column (3), this estimate is .0142, compared to an unrestricted estimate of
.0345 +.0137—.0482.Thus the restricted estimates of ft1 +ft1are biased down because they
combine these two effects. This underestimate of within-job growth accounts (or most of the lost
value of ft2 in the restricted model.
Vi. Conclusion
The idea that compensation rises with job tenure or seniority is the most fundamental
prediction of the theory of specific human capital. It is also a key prediction of other contracting
models in which the timing of compensation over the life of a job plays a strategic role in
recruiting and motivating employees. Estimates of the return to seniority based on survey data
have tended to support this class of theories, though these estimates have ignored potential biases
generated by individuals' mobility decisions. Theory provides only limited guidance on the
direction of these biases, and virtually none on their importance. Correcting for these biases in
longitudinal data, my estimates imply a very strong connection between job seniority and wages
in the typical employment relationship: other things constant, 10 years of job seniority raises the
wage of the typical worker by over 25 percent. For the procedures that I have used, theory and
related evidence suggest that this estimate is a lower bound on the true return to job seniority.
These results conform to several related facts about wages and the durability of jobs. For
example, turnover rates are substantially lower among senior workers, even controlling for
individual and job—specific factors that affect mobility (Topel and Ward, 1988), and the typical
employment relationship in the U.S. is remarkably durable (Hall, 1982). These observations are
difficult to explain in the absence of rising wages and accumulating specific capital. Further,
estimates of the "costs" of displacement and unemployment indicate that the wage losses from
these events are substantially larger for workers who had held their jobs longer (Carrington,
mrhe corresponding estimate from Abraham and Farber (1987) is 1.7 percent.29
1989). Results inthis paper implythis, but alsothat the period of recovery from an initialwage
lossmaybe fairlyshort.
Theseconclusions must be temperedby thefact that tenure only measurestimein a
particular job, and may be only remotely related to the relevant concept of human capital. Inone
sense this measurement error implies that true returns may be even larger. Yet if human capital
is specific to industries or sectors of the economy, and not to jobs, then job tenuremay easily
capture the returns to the broader concept of human capital, especially when job changes are
infrequent. Nevertheless, the evidence presented here offers no support for the view that seniority
has a negligible impact on wages.APPENDIX A
THE DATA
The data used in this study are from thefirst16 waves of the Panel Study of Income
Dynamics.The sampleis restricted to white male heads of households who had positive earnings
during theprevious calendaryear,andwhowere betweenthe agesof18and60at the survey
date.Personsfrom Alaska and Hawaiiwere excluded. Jobswereexcluded iftherespondent
reported that he wasselfemployed at any timeduring thejob, ifheworked for the government,
if hereported agriculturalemployment, or iftheobservationwas from theSEO (poverty)
subsample of the PSID. Finally, since wages refer to avenge hourlyearnings in the year
preceding thesurvey, observation for whichcurrent jobtenurewasless than one year were
deleted.Otherexclusionsbasedonreported jobtenurearedescribed below.
Jobtenureis the key variable intheanalysis. Measuredjobtenureinthe data isoften
recordedin wide intervals, andalarge number of observationsare lost becausetenure is missing.
Further, a large number of inconsistencies occur in the data.Forexample, reported tenure may
fallbytenyearsor more between years of a single job, andperiods of missingtenure are
followedby years in which a respondentreportsmore than 20 yearsofseniority forthe remainder
ofthe job.Inthe recordedtenure datathe range of year to year changes in job tenure is from -
31years to 7.5 years. In 324 cases (3.8%) measured tenure declines between years of a job, and in
51 cases the decline is greater than five years. Because tenure is recorded in intervals. 36% of all
year to year changes in tenure fall below the theoretical value of 1.0.
In light of these errors, I reconstructed job tenure as follows. For jobs that begin in the
panel, tenure is started at zero and incremented by one for each year in which a person works.
Thus experience and tenure progress at the same rate. For jobs that were in progress at the
beginning of a person's record, I gauged starting tenure relative to the period in which the person
achieved his maximum reported tenure on a job. Again, tenure and experience increment by one
for each yearinwhich the person works.
Even with this procedure, there are many ambiguities about starting and ending dates of
3031
jobs. In many cases the recorded sequence of job tenures seems to indicate a job change (e.g.,
tenurefallsto zero, and then rises smoothly for the remainder of the job, or the worker indicates
unemploymentdue to a permanent layoff), though no change of employer is recordedinthe data.
I consideredalarge number of such circumstancesgeneratedby numerous cross-checksonthe
data.My basic procedurewas to deleteall jobs wheresignificantambiguities occurred. In
practice, these deletionshadvery minor effects on the results and none on the conclusions.
Allofthesample selectioncriteria are documented in the programsandoutput underlying
thisresearch. Theseareavailableatcost.Summary statisticsare reportedinTable Al.TABLE A.1
VARIABLE DEFINITIONSAND SUMMARY STATISTICS
PSIDWHITEMALES, 1968-83
Variable Definition Mean S.D.
Realwage Log avenge hourly earnings 1.131 .497
deflatedby CI'S wage index
andON? price deflator
Experience Years inlabormarket 20.021 11.045
Tenure Years of current job seniority 9.978 8.944
Education Years of completed schooling 12.645 2.809
Married I it currently married, .925 .263
spouse present
Union I if union member .344 .473
SMSA I it reside inSMSA .644 .478
Disabled 1 if currently reporting disability .074 .262
CPS Real
















1983 .068 1.089APPENDIX B
TIME SERIES PROPERTIES OF WAGE INNOVATIONS
As noted in IV.B, if the evolution of wages within jobs follows a random walk, thenthe
residualsof the wage growth model are serially independent. Then least squares applied to (4) is
an efficient estimator of fi1+ $. Infact, matters are slightly more complicated than that. Based
on estimates of the first difference model reported in Table 2, which are discussed below, Table
8.1 shows the estimated autocovariances of the residuals,
(8.1) - —+ •—
Noticein panel A of Table 8.1 that the first-difference residuals are strongly negatively
correlated at lag one (—.39), and that higher order lags show weak and usually negative
autocorrelation? The strong negative correlation in the residuals at lag one suggests the
importance of transitory shocks, v, in c. However, if wage innovations were purely transitory,
the theoretical correlation at lag one would be —.50, which is decisively rejected by the data. I
therefore model the evolving component of c as
(8.2) — +
wherethe innovation q is iid with variance c,,,. Model (8.2) nests lid wage shocks (p •0)and a
random walk (pa I) as special cases.






acorrelatiouat higher lags than those shown in the tablearenegligible.
3233
wherec denotestheautocovariance atlagk.Inspection of(B.3) andtheestimated
autocorrelationof-.39 stronglysuggest p> 0,and theweakestimated correlationsat higher tags
suggest p close to 1.0.Method of moments estimates of ft —(p, a,,,) are shownin panelBof
TableDI? The key resultisthat? is not materiallydifferent thanunity. Thus the best evidence
is that the evolution of wages within jobs is a random walk (with drift)?This evidence is of
independent interest since it implies that the current wage is essentially asufficient statistic for
the distribution of future wages, and therefore for mobility decisions. More importantlyfor
present purposes, this evidence also favors the first-differencemodel as an estimator of within-
job growth, since wage innovations are serially independent?
ame estimator minimizes the quadratic form (C -F(fl)rttlC-F(ulYJ,where Cdenotesthe
estimated vector of autocovariances, 1(0) istheright hand side of (11), and E is an estimate of
the covariance matrix of C, calculated from the fourth moments of the data.
'°This finding is robust across data sets. Topel and Ward find nearly identical parameter
values among young men in the Longitudinal Employee-Employer Data (LEED).
31The specification in (10) attributes all of the random walk component of the wage to job-
specific (actors. This is an overly restrictive interpretation. If general productivityevolves as a
random walk, then the within-job autocovariances of the residuals would be unchanged.Thus
the division between changes in job- and person-specific factors is not identified. Topeland
Ward find that within-job wage changes have a strong impact on subsequent mobility,which
implies an important role for job-specific factors.TABLE B.!
ESTIMATED COVARIANCE STRUCTURE FOR WAGE INNOVATIONS
Panel A:
Covariances and Correlations of E- atVarious Lags
Lag
0 I 2 3 4 5
Covariance .0476-.0176 .00058-.00166-.00014 -.00067
(.0019) (.0014)(.0008)(.0007) (.0008)(.0007)
Correlation - -.3938 .0132-.0394 -.0034-.0163
Panel B:




NOTES.--Inpanel A. estimatesareautocovariancesofresiduals from the first difference
modelof within-job wage growthreported in Thbh4Icolumn3 Panel B reports method of
momentsestimates of the permanent-transitory disturbance model given in equations (B.2) and
(B.3). Standard errors are in parentheses.34
APPENDIX C
IMPUTATIONOF THE RESIDUAL LIFE OF A JOB
In order to estimate the residual life of a job for right-censored spells used in Table 8. I




whereZA:)isa vector of observable determinants of mobility. Note that unobserved sourcesof
job of individual heterogeneity are ignored. In practice job endings areknown to occur within a
calendar year, so the discrete time hazard based on (C. I) is
(C.2) 4r) —I—exp(-JT+IeZt)1du).
WhereXAT) is the probability that a job ends between periods rand r+I. In specifyingelements o
ZIassumethesame vector of regressors listed in Table A.!. The estimated residuallife of a job
is then constructed from the estimated survivor function of (C.2). Maximum likelihoodestimates
of i are shown in Table C.l.TABLE CA
ESTIMATEDDISCRETE TIME HAZARDFOR JOB ENDINGS




Tenure (0-1) —.5784 .0821
Tenure (> 1) -.34699 .0299
Tenure2 (> 1) .01718 .0030
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